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Future wage payments drive a wedge between total firm output and the output share
received by the firm’s owners, thus potentially distorting strategic decisions by the firm’s
owners such as, e.g., whether to continue the firm, sell it, or shut it down. Using an optimal
contracting approach, we show that the unique optimal firm-wide employee compensation
scheme from this perspective is a broad-based option plan. Broad-based option payminimizes
the firm’s expected future wage payments in states of nature where the firm is only marginally
profitable, thus making continuation as attractive as possible in precisely those states of
nature where, e.g., a high fixed wage would lead the firm’s owners to inefficiently exit.
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1 Introduction
Future wage payments drive a wedge between total firm output and the output share received
by the firm’s owners, thereby distorting strategic decisions by the firm’s owners such as, e.g.,
whether to continue the firm, sell it, or shut it down. For instance, in states of nature where
the firm is only marginally profitable, the firm’s owners should ideally receive all of the firm’s
future cash flow to have optimal incentives to continue. But if, e.g., employees are promised a
high fixed wage, most of this cash flow will go to the employees. Hence, a high fixed wage may
create a severe “wage overhang problem” in states where the firm’s expected future cash flow is
small, thereby inducing the firm’s owners to inefficiently exit.
This suggests a basic, but fundamental principle: When the firm’s expected future cash flow
is small, expected future wage payments should also be small. According to this principle, any
form of variable compensation is better than a fixed wage. But what is the optimal form of
variable compensation? We address this question from first principles in an optimal contracting
framework with a large class of admissible compensation schemes. We find that the unique
optimal aggregate, i.e., firm-wide compensation scheme is a broad-based option plan. (If there
is a subsistence requirement, employees additionally receive a base wage.)
The intuition is simple: Broad-based option pay minimizes the firm’s expected future wage
payments in precisely those states of nature where the firm is only marginally profitable, thus
shifting more wage payments from low into high states (where they do not matter for the
continuation decision) than, e.g., stock or any other form of variable pay.
Our argument might help to understand why firms use option grants to compensate middle-
and lower-level employees. Hall and Murphy (2003) find that more than 90 percent of total
company stock option grants in the United States are awarded to managers and employees below
the top-five executive level.1 They conclude that “given the increasing prevalence of broad-based
plans, a compelling theory of employee stock options must explain not only executive stock
options, but also options granted to the rank and file” (p. 54).
We will review some of the main arguments for broad-based option pay in the following
section. We do not view our argument as exclusive, but rather as complementary to arguments
1See Mehran and Tracy (2001) and Oyer and Schaefer (2003) for related evidence.
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based on the decisions made by individual employees, such as retention and sorting arguments.
Also, our objective function in this paper is the maximization of firm value, which means our
argument has little to say about situations in which employee compensation is set for reasons
other than firm value maximization.While our argument appears to be particularly relevant for
smaller, owner-controlled firms, we believe it also relevant for larger firms as long as firm value
is being maximized.2
Let us briefly run through the main arguments of our model. In the center is the owner of
a firm who must decide whether or not to continue his business. The owner’s optimal decision
depends on the “state of nature,” which generates a probability distribution over future cash
flows. Higher states of nature are associated with “better” cash-flow distributions in the usual
sense. The state of nature is indicative of the firm’s success, e.g., it may capture how successful
the firm has been in the past in finding buyers, striking deals with suppliers and vendors, or
establishing a sales and distribution network.
The state of nature is ex ante uncertain, which captures the usual entrepreneurial risk that
the owner does not know in advance how successful he will be. At an interim date, the owner
privately observes the state of nature and decides whether to continue. The first-best decision
is to continue if the expected cash flow from continuation exceeds the opportunity cost from
continuation, which holds if and only if the state of nature is sufficiently high. This opportunity
cost includes, e.g., forgone revenues from not liquidating or selling the firm, as well as any effort
or investment by the owner that is necessary for the firm’s continuation.
Since the owner privately observes the state of nature, his decision whether to continue
is discretionary. Expected wage payments drive a wedge between the first-best continuation
decision and the owner’s privately optimal decision. In particular, in marginally profitable
states where the firm’s expected future cash flow from continuation barely exceeds the cost of
continuation, the owner may nevertheless exit as he only receives the firm’s expected cash flow
2See also Oyer and Schaefer (2003), who take as their “starting point the assertion that broad-based stock
option plans are in shareholders’ interests” (p. 16). Oyer and Schaefer (2003) and Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker
(2003) find that broad-based option pay is particularly prevalent in new-economy firms, which tend to fit the
above description. Larger firms in which founders have large ownership stakes, such as, e.g., Microsoft or Oracle,
also often have broad option plans.
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minus expected wage payments.
The question is therefore what form of employee compensation minimizes the distortions in
the owner’s decision? We find that the unique optimal aggregate, i.e., firm-wide compensation
scheme is a broad-based option plan. If there is a subsistence requirement, employees additionally
receive a base wage. Intuitively, broad-based option pay minimizes the firm’s expected future
wage payments in low, and hence marginally profitable, states of nature, thus minimizing the
wedge between the first-best continuation decision and the owner’s privately optimal decision. By
contrast, any other form of employee compensation (e.g., stock grants) implies higher expected
wage payments in marginal states of nature, thus making continuation unprofitable in states
where it might have been profitable under broad-based option pay.
In an extension of our model, we allow for the possibility that employees additionally receive
severance pay. This has no qualitative effects on our results. In another extension, we allow
for the possibility that the owner receives private benefits from continuation. As these private
benefits also enter into the first best, the inefficiency that the owner exits too often relative to
the first best remains the same. However, if the owner’s private benefits are sufficiently large,
it may now be the case that the owner continues even though the firm’s continuation value
(excluding private benefits) lies below its liquidation value. For an outside observer who does
not know the owner’s private benefits, it would then appear as if the owner exits too little.
The driving force in our model is the owner’s inability to commit to a decision rule due to
his private information. If the owner could commit to a decision rule based on the true state
of nature, the optimal compensation scheme would be trivial. Precisely, there would be an
infinite number of compensation schemes (including a fixed wage) that can implement the first
best. In this regard, our setting is related to Grossman and Hart (1983) and other models of
implicit labor contracting under asymmetric information. In their model, the owner of a firm
must decide whether to lay off workers after privately observing the state of nature. Unlike our
model, Grossman and Hart assume that workers receive a fixed wage. This generates excessive
unemployment, which is the primary focus of the implicit labor contracting literature.3
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief review of the
literature on broad-based option pay. Section 3 presents the basic model. Section 4 derives
3Weitzman (1985) makes a similar point from a general equilibrium perspective.
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our main results. Section 5 considers severance pay and private benefits of the owner. It also
considers renegotiations, which are potentially important as the owner’s decision is inefficient in
marginally profitable states of nature. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Unlike the firm’s CEO, an individual worker’s effort or ability has only a small impact on firm
output. Accordingly, Hall and Murphy (2003), Lazear (1999), Oyer and Schaefer (2003), and
others have argued that it may be difficult to explain the widespread use of broad option grants
with traditional arguments for variable pay such as moral hazard or sorting based on ability.4 On
the other hand, broad-based option pay may work as a sorting device if sorting is with respect
to employee risk aversion or optimism about the firm’s prospects rather than ability (Bergman
and Jenter (2003), Oyer and Schaefer (2003, 2004)).
Other explanations for broad-based option pay are the favorable tax and accounting treat-
ment of stock options (Hall and Murphy (2003)) and cash constraints (Core and Guay (2001),
Kedia and Mozumdar (2002)). However, Oyer and Schaefer’s (2004) calibration analysis casts
doubt on the accounting argument, while Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003), Oyer and Schae-
fer (2004), and Bergman and Jenter (2003) find that broad option grants are unlikely to be
driven by cash constraints. In our model, cash constraints play no role.
Oyer (2004) argues that equity-linked pay can be an effective instrument to retain employ-
ees. The idea is that if a firm’s stock price is positively correlated with the employee’s outside
opportunities, the value of his compensation package is high precisely when his outside oppor-
tunities are good, and vice versa. Empirical support for this argument is provided by Oyer and
Schaefer (2003, 2004) and Kedia and Mozumdar (2002). Like this argument, our argument also
suggests an efficiency rationale for broad-based option pay, albeit we focus on decisions made
by the firm’s owners, not on decisions made by individual employees.
Finally, Hall and Murphy (2003) and Bergman and Jenter (2003) offer behavioral expla-
4Lazear (1999) cautions that the sorting-by-ability argument “does not explain why some firms give stock
options even to very low-level workers”.
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nations for broad-based option pay.5 Hall and Murphy argue that boards and firm owners
erroneously perceive option plans as “cheap to grant because there is no accounting cost and
no cash outlay, and granting decisions are based on this inaccurate “perceived cost” rather than
the much-higher economic cost of options” (p. 61). Bergman and Jenter argue that overopti-
mistic employees are willing to overpay for option grants. Firms rationally take advantage of
this overoptimism by paying employees in the form of option grants.
3 The Model
We examine the decision of a firm’s owner whether to continue his business. For simplicity,
we assume that the firm has a single employee. As there is no (strategic) interaction among
employees, we may view this employee as being representative of all employees in the firm. We
denote the owner by P (for principal) and the employee by A (for agent).
If the firm is continued, it generates a stochastic cash flow x ∈ X = [x, x], where 0 ≤ x < x,
and where x can be either finite or infinite. For convenience, we set x = 0, albeit all our results
extend to x > 0. The cash-flow distribution Gθ(x) depends on the underlying state of nature
θ ∈ Θ := [θ, θ]. We assume Gθ(x) is atomless and the density gθ(x) is positive everywhere and
continuous in both x and θ. The expected cash flow conditional on the state of nature is denoted
by E[x | θ] := RX xgθ(x)dx.6
We may also assume that the owner receives private continuation benefits of B ≥ 0. While
this has interesting implications for the owner’s continuation decision, it does not affect our
qualitative results. For expositional clarity, we initially set B = 0. The case where B > 0 is
considered in Section 5.1.
As argued in the Introduction, the state of nature is indicative of the firm’s success. Specif-
ically, we assume that higher states of nature are associated with a more favorable cash-flow
distribution in the following sense:
Assumption 1. The hazard rate gθ(x)/[1−Gθ(x)] is strictly decreasing in θ for all x ≤ x.
5See also Weitzman and Kruse (1990, p. 100), who argue that stock-based compensation creates a “corporate
culture that emphasizes company spirit.”
6 If x is infinite, we assume that E[x | θ] exists.
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Assumption 1 is relatively standard in contracting models and known as monotone hazard rate
property (MHRP), or log-concavity.7
Only the owner observes the true state of nature and therefore the cash-flow distribution Gθ .
While employees (and courts) may realistically have some notion of how well the firm is doing,
it seems plausible to us that the owner knows more about the firm’s future prospects. It is this
informational asymmetry that we try to capture here.
The alternative to continuation is exit, i.e., to discontinue the firm’s business. We denote the
owner’s (opportunity) cost of continuation by L. This may include forgone revenues from not
liquidating or selling the firm, any effort or investment by the owner that is necessary for the
firm’s continuation, as well as any profit which the owner forgoes by not pursuing alternative
activities. The employee’s opportunity cost of continuation consists of forgone unemployment
benefits. For simplicity, we assume that these unemployment benefits provide the employee
with a minimum subsistence level, which we denote by J. Hence, the total opportunity cost of
continuation is L+J.While introducing unemployment benefits adds realism to our model, it is
unrelated to our economic argument for why options are optimal. Moreover, it is straightforward
to extend our model to include unemployment benefits exceeding J or (forgone) wages from
alternative employment, which might also exceed J . Any extension along these lines yields no
major additional insights, however.
Benchmark: First-Best Decision Rule. Let us briefly state the first-best decision rule. By
Assumption 1 and continuity of gθ(x), the conditional expected cash flow E[x | θ] is continuous
and increasing in θ. To rule out trivial cases where continuation is either always (i.e., in all
states of nature) or never optimal, we assume that E[x | θ] > L + J and E[x | θ] < L + J .
Consequently, there exists a unique cutoff θFB ∈ (θ, θ) given by E[x | θFB] = L + J such that
E[x | θ] ≥ L + J if and only if θ ≥ θFB. The first-best decision rule is therefore to continue if
θ ≥ θFB and to exit if θ < θFB. ¤
There are three dates: t = 0, t = 0.5, and t = 1. At t = 0 the employee receives a wage
contract. At this stage, the state of nature is uncertain and represented by the distribution
7See Laffont and Tirole (1993) for an economic interpretation. MHRP is implied by, and thus weaker than,
the monotone likelihood ratio property, which is satisfied by many standard distributions (Milgrom (1981)).
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function F (θ), which is common knowledge. We assume F (θ) has no atoms and the density f(θ)
is positive everywhere. At t = 0.5 the owner privately observes the state of nature and decides
whether to continue. At t = 1–if the firm is continued–the cash flow x is realized and the
employee receives his wage payment w(x).8
Before we proceed, a comment is in order. If the firm is shut down, the employee is formally
entitled to any past wage payments that have accrued during his employment period, but not
to forgone future wage payments or, e.g., end-of-year bonus pay.9 We could easily introduce an
interim wage payment (e.g., at t = 0.5) that the employee receives irrespective of the owner’s
continuation decision. From the owner’s perspective, what matters for his decision is solely the
firm’s future cash flows and wage payments. Past cash flows and wage payments are sunk and
thus irrelevant. To capture this intuition in the simplest possible way, we have assumed that
there is a single (future) date when cash flows are realized and wages are paid.
We impose the following restriction on the employee’s compensation scheme:
Assumption 2. Both w(x) and x− w(x) are nondecreasing everywhere.
This restriction is common in contracting models of this sort (e.g., Innes (1990)). It implies,
among other things, that neither the employee nor the owner has an incentive to either destroy
output or borrow on the market to boost output.
We may also assume that the compensation scheme must guarantee the employee a minimum
subsistence level, implying that w(x) ≥ J.10 As in the case of the employee’s unemployment
benefits, this constraint–while adding realism to our model–is unrelated to our economic
argument for why options are optimal. To illustrate this, we first derive our main results for
the case where J = 0. Subsequently, we show that the intuition straightforwardly extends to the
8While w(x) cannot directly condition on the state of nature, the owner could, in principle, make the employee’s
wage payment contingent on θ by choosing a wage contract from a prespecified menu after observing the state of
nature. Absent any additional sorting variable, such a menu has no benefits. In fact, one can show that a menu
of wage contracts is strictly suboptimal in our model.
9Employment contracts frequently compensate employees for forgone future wage payments by stipulating
severance pay. This is voluntary, however. See Section 5.2. for an analysis of severance pay.
10This is possible as we do not assume that the firm is cash constrained. Alternatively, we could have assumed
that x ≥ J, in which case the subsistence wage can always be paid out of the firm’s cash flow.
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case where J > 0.
We finally introduce a simple incentive problem implying that the employee’s expected com-
pensation under continuation must exceed his unemployment benefits. Between t = 0 and
t = 0.5, the employee can perform a job-related task at private cost ∆. In the broadest sense,
we can think of this task as “doing the job well”. Whether or not the employee has performed
the task is observable only at t = 1. Optimality then implies that the employee be compensated
if and only if he has performed his task. (The subsistence constraint w(x) ≥ J needs to hold
only in equilibrium.)
The employee’s compensation will be optimally set to make him indifferent between perform-
ing and not performing the task. From a t = 0.5 perspective, however, such compensation con-
stitutes a rent, because at this point the employee has already perfomed his task (in equilibrium).
The employee’s incentive-compatibility constraint therefore translates into an “efficiency-wage
constraint” stating that–to compensate the employee for performing his task–his expected
compensation if the firm is continued must exceed his unemployment benefits.11
We derive the efficiency-wage constraint from first principles in Section 5.3. At this point,
let us merely note that–other than implying that the employee must be compensated for his
privately incurred cost ∆–it has no immediate implications for the functional form of w(x) and
thus for our results. In fact, we will show in the following section that if the state of nature was
observable, there exists an infinite number of optimal compensation schemes (including a flat
wage) satisfying the efficiency-wage constraint and implementing the first best.
Second, we do not need to assume that the employee’s task has any significant impact on
firm output. All we need to assume is that it is efficient to induce the employee to perform the
task. For concreteness, suppose if the employee performs the task, the output technology is as
described above. By contrast, if he does not perform the task, the firm incurs a small cost C,
e.g., it may lose a customer because the employee did not spend enough time to maintain the
customer relationship. All we need to assume is that C is sufficiently large relative to ∆.12
11There are many possible reasons why the employee’s expected compensation under continuation ought to
exceed his unemployment benefits; the incentive problem here is just one possibility. See Yellen (1994) for an
overview of efficiency-wage arguments.
12Alternatively, we could have assumed that not performing the task has a (small) negative impact on the cash-
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4 Optimality of Broad-Based Option Pay
We proceed in two steps. We first derive the owner’s continuation decision at t = 0.5 as a
function of the state of nature. In a second step, we solve for the optimal compensation scheme
w(x) that maximizes the owner’s expected payoff at t = 0.
Generally, the owner will find it optimal to continue if and only if the expected cash flow
minus any promised wage payments exceeds his opportunity cost of continuation, i.e., if E[x−
w(x) | θ] ≥ L. We ignore trivial cases where the owner either always (i.e., for all θ) or never
continues; it is straightforward to provide conditions ruling these cases out. If both continuation
and exit are optimal for some θ, what is the owner’s optimal decision rule? The following lemma
shows that the optimal decision rule takes a simple form: continue if and only if the state of
nature is sufficiently high.
The intuition for why the owner’s decision rule is a cutoff rule is straightforward. By Assump-
tion 2, x−w(x) is nondecreasing everywhere. Moreover, it cannot be the case that x−w(x) = 0
for all x, or else the owner would always exit. Consequently, x−w(x) must be strictly increasing
for some x on a set of positive measure. In conjunction with Assumption 1 and continuity of
gθ(x) in θ, this in turn implies that the owner’s expected payoff E[x − w(x) | θ] is continuous
and strictly increasing in θ. There consequently exists a cutoff state θP ∈ (θ, θ) such that the
owner finds it optimal to continue if θ ≥ θP and to exit if θ < θP .13
Lemma 1. There exists a unique state of nature θP = θP (w(x)) ∈ (θ, θ) given by E[x−w(x) |
θP ] = L such that the owner continues if and only if θ ≥ θP .
While the owner’s privately optimal cutoff θP (w(x)) depends on the compensation scheme w(x),
we omit the argument in what follows and simply write θP .
Equipped with Lemma 1, we can derive the optimal compensation scheme w(x) offered at
t = 0. The optimal choice of w(x) maximizes the owner’s expected payoffZ θ
θP
E[x−w(x) | θ]f(θ)dθ + LF (θP ), (1)
flow distribution Gθ(x). As this concerns out-of-equilibrium behavior, it does not enter into the efficiency-wage
constraint. See Section 5.3 for more details.
13Without loss of generality, we assume that the owner continues if he is indifferent.
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subject to (i) the employee’s subsistence constraint w(x) ≥ J for all x, and (ii) the efficiency-wage
constraint Z θ
θP
[E[w(x) | θ]− J ]f(θ)dθ ≥ ∆. (2)
(See Section 5.3 for a derivation of this constraint.) We can rewrite (2) asZ θ
θP
E[w(x) | θ] f(θ)
1− F (θP )
dθ ≥ J + ∆
1− F (θP )
, (3)
which states that the employee’s expected compensation if the firm is continued (left-hand side)
must exceed his unemployment benefit J by an amount ∆/[1−F (θP )].14 Accordingly, the higher
the owner’s cutoff θP , the lower is the probability 1−F (θP ) that the firm is continued, and the
higher must therefore be the employee’s expected compensation if the firm is continued.15
By standard arguments, (2) must bind at the optimal solution.
Lemma 2. The efficiency-wage constraint (2) must bind at the optimum.
Proof. See Appendix.
Substituting the binding efficiency-wage constraint (2) into the owner’s objective function
(1), we have that the owner chooses w(x) to maximizeZ θ
θP
[E[x | θ]− J − L]f(θ)dθ + L−∆, (4)
subject to w(x) ≥ J , where θP depends on w(x) through E[x − w(x) | θP ] = L by Lemma 1.
By inspection, (4) attains its maximum at θP = θFB. Intuitively, as the owner is the residual
claimant to the firm’s cash flow, he would ideally like to commit to the (first-best) efficient
decision rule. Indeed, if such commitment was possible, the choice of optimal compensation
scheme would be trivial, as the following comments illustrate.
Benchmark: Observable States of Nature. If the owner could commit to a particular
decision rule, say, θP = θˆ, there exists an infinite number of optimal compensation schemes
14While the employee can rationally infer the owner’s cutoff θP , he does not know the true state θ. All he
knows is that θ ≥ θP , where f(θ)/[1− F (θP )] is the posterior probability of θ given that the firm is continued.
15 If (2) is satisfied, the employee’s ex-ante participation constraint holds trivially, while his interim participation
constraint is slack. As both participation constraints are implied by (2), we refrain from writing them down.
11
satisfying all constraints. For example, under the fixed-wage contract w(x) = B := J +∆/[1−
F (θˆ)] the efficiency-wage constraint (2) holds with equality, while the employee’s subsistence
constraint w(x) ≥ J is slack. Hence, if the owner could commit to, say, θP = θFB, he could
trivially implement the first best with a “flat” wage equal to w(x) = B.
This confirms our earlier assertion that–unlike a “standard” moral hazard problem–the
incentive problem here has no immediate consequences for the form of the employee’s compen-
sation scheme w(x). All it does is add a requirement that the employee’s expected compensation
if the firm is continued must be sufficiently hight to compensate him for his privately incurred
cost∆, implying that it must exceed his unemployment benefit J. However, it says nothing about
how precisely this compensation ought to be divided across cash flows x ∈ [x, x] or continuation
states θ ≥ θP , which is what our main argument is all about. ¤
Returning to our original setting where θ is private information, we now derive the solution
to the owner’s maximization problem. For expositional clarity, we first consider the case where
J = 0. We show that (i) under any admissible compensation scheme w(x) the owner exits in
too many states of nature, and (ii) the compensation scheme minimizing this inefficiency is an
option on the firm’s cash flow. Subsequently, we show that this intuition extends to the case
where J > 0.
Let us begin by assuming that J = 0. In this case, the first-best cutoff is given by E[x |
θFB] = L. The efficiency-wage constraint (2), however, requires that w(x) > 0 on a set of
positive measure, which immediately implies that E[x − w(x) | θ] < E[x | θ] for all θ, which
in turn implies that θP 6= θFB. Hence, the owner’s privately optimal continuation decision is
inefficient. Indeed, we can say more about this inefficiency: as E[x | θ] and E[x− w(x) | θ] are
both continuous and strictly increasing in θ (see above), and E[x− w(x) | θ] < E[x | θ] for all
θ, it must be true that E[x − w(x) | θFB] < E[x | θFB] = L, and hence that θP > θFB. The
inefficiency is thus that the owner’s optimal cutoff lies strictly above the first-best cutoff. This
holds for any admissible compensation scheme w(x). Intuitively, the fact that the employee must
be compensated drives a wedge between the expected firm cash flow E[x | θ] and the owner’s
share of this cash flow, E[x − w(x) | θ]. As a result, the owner exits in marginally profitable
states θ ∈ [θFB, θP ), which is inefficient.16
16The fact that the owner exits in too many states of nature holds irrespective of whether Assumption 2 holds.
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The owner’s problem is consequently one-sided: The optimal compensation scheme w(x)
must minimize the owner’s incentives to exit, i.e., it must minimize the owner’s cutoff θP ,
thereby bringing it closer to the first-best cutoff θFB.We now argue that the unique solution to
this problem is to give the employee an option on the firm’s cash flow.
An option minimizes w(x) when x is small. As small x are relatively more likely after low
states of nature (Assumption 1), an option thus minimizes the employee’s expected compensation
E[w(x) | θ] in low states of nature.17 This implies that it maximizes the owner’s expected payoff
E[x−w(x) | θ] in low states of nature, thus pushing the critical cutoff state θP where the owner
is just indifferent between continuing and not continuing as far down as possible towards θFB.18
Put simply, an option minimizes the firm’s expected future wage costs in low states of nature,
thus making it as attractive as possible to continue in these states.
There is a more general principle at work. If the owner continues at θ = θP , he also
continues in all higher states θ ≥ θP . Hence, we only need to consider the owner’s expected
payoff in marginally profitable states of nature. His expected payoff in inframarginal states
θ > θP is irrelevant. Accordingly, the optimal compensation scheme must make continuation as
attractive as possible for the owner in marginal states. This is precisely what an option does: it
shifts more wage costs from low into high states of nature (where wage costs do not matter for
efficiency) than any other form of compensation scheme.
Let us now consider the case where J > 0. The underlying problem is the same: As the
employee must be compensated for performing his task, his expected compensation if the firm is
continued must exceed his unemployment benefit.19 Again, this drives a wedge between the first-
best cutoff and the owner’s privately optimal cutoff, with the consequence that θP > θFB. Like
above, the employee cares only about his expected compensation if the firm is continued, while
If Assumption 2 holds, however, we can express the inefficiency in a simple way through the difference θP − θFB.
17This is subject to the efficiency-wage constraint (2) and Assumption 2 that x− w(x) be nondecreasing.
18There is never a concern that θP may be pushed down too far, i.e., below θFB: As we have shown above, for
any admissible compensation scheme w(x) it holds that θP > θFB.
19By (3) we have that Z θ
θP
[E[w(x)− J | θ] f(θ)
1− F (θP )
dθ ≥ ∆
1− F (θP )
,
where the left-hand side denotes the employee’s expected excess compensation if the firm is continued.
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the owner cares about how precisely this compensation is divided across cash flows x ∈ [x, x] and
thus across continuation states θ ≥ θP . The solution, again, is to shift as much as possible of
the employee’s compensation into high states of nature as this maximizes the owner’s expected
payoff in marginally profitable states. This implies that the subsistence constraint w(x) ≥ J
must bind, which in turn implies that the optimal solution is an option plus a base wage equal
to J . Hence, the only effect of introducing J > 0 is that it adds a base wage to the optimal
compensation scheme.
Proposition 1. The unique optimal compensation scheme is to pay the employee a base wage
plus an option on the firm’s cash flow. And yet, under the optimal compensation scheme the
owner exits in too many states of nature relative to the first best.
Proof. See Appendix.
We have assumed that the owner can commit to some compensation scheme w(x) despite the
fact that it induces inefficient decisions in some states of nature. As it turns out, such a strong
assumption is not necessary. In the following section, we show that the optimal compensation
scheme in Proposition 1 is the unique optimal renegotiation-proof compensation scheme if new
offers can be made after the state of nature has materialized. The reason, in short, is that
renegotiations take place under asymmetric information, which implies the owner will try to use
his informational advantage to obtain wage concessions from the employee even in high states
θ > θP where he would have ordinarily continued. As the employee anticipates this, he is better
off not renegotiating the original (i.e., optimal) compensation scheme.
5 Extensions and Robustness
5.1 Private Benefits of Continuation
The decision of entrepreneurs to continue their firms may not always be solely guided by profit
maximization. Entrepreneurs may also receive private benefits from continuation, i.e., they may
gain further valuable experience, build up a reputation vis-à-vis employees and customers, or
simply enjoy running their firms.
Suppose continuation entails nonpecuniary private benefits B > 0 for the owner. To again
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rule out trivial cases where continuation is either always or never (first-best) efficient, we assume
that E[x | θ] +B > L+ J and E[x | θ] +B < L+ J . Introducing private benefits changes the
optimal continuation decision as follows. The first-best decision is now to continue if and only
if θ ≥ θFB, where θFB is given by
E[x | θFB] +B = L+ J. (5)
By the same token, the owner’s privately optimal decision rule is to continue if and only if
θ ≥ θP , where the optimal cutoff θP is given by
E[x− w(x) | θP ] +B = L. (6)
Let bL := L − B denote the owner’s opportunity cost of continuation net of his private
benefits. Given this transformation, it is immediate that all our results continue to hold, except
that we now have bL instead of L. In particular, it holds that θP > θFB, while the unique optimal
compensation scheme is again to pay the employee a base wage equal to J plus an option on
the firm’s cash flow. The crux is that the owner’s private benefits enter both into the first-best
decision rule and the owner’s privately optimal decision rule. From an efficieny standpoint, the
owner thus again exits too often (relative to the first best, that is).
Interestingly, if B is sufficiently large, it is possible that E[x | θP ] < L. In this case, there
exist states of nature where the owner continues even though the firm’s continuation value (i.e.,
the expected cash flow from continuation excluding the owner’s private benefits) is less than its
liquidation or sales value. From the perspective of an outsider who does not observe the owner’s
private benefits, it then appears as if the owner exits too little.
5.2 Severance Pay
We now introduce the possibility that the employee’s compensation scheme includes both a wage
payment w(x) if the firm is continued and a (severance) payment S if the firm is discontinued.
Severance pay has both costs and benefits. It is costly for two reasons: first, the owner
incurs an additional cost of S if he chooses to exit. Second, the employee’s “outside income” at
t = 0.5 is now J + S instead of merely J. As the employee’s expected compensation if the firm
is continued must exceed his outside income by an amount ∆/[1− F (θP )], this implies that his
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expected compensation under continuation must also increase by S. Formally, the efficiency-wage
constraint (2) becomes Z θ
θP
[E[w(x) | θ]− J − S]f(θ)dθ ≥ ∆, (7)
which can be rewritten asZ θ
θP
E[w(x) | θ] f(θ)
1− F (θP )
dθ ≥ J + S + ∆
1− F (θP )
.
Hence, the employee’s expected compensation if the firm is continued (left-hand side) must
increase by an amount S.
Introducing S > 0 also entails benefits. While the employee only cares that his expected com-
pensation under continuation increases by S, the owner cares about how precisely this increase
is divided across cash flows x ∈ [x, x] and thus across continuation states θ ≥ θP . Specifically, if
w(x) is an option (plus a base wage), the entire increase in the employee’s compensation occurs
at high cash flows and thus primarily in high states of nature. Consequently, while the employ-
ee’s expected compensation increases overall by an amount S, it increases by more than S in
high states of nature and by less than S in low states of nature. Hence, the owner’s expected
payoff from continuing decreases by less than S in low states of nature. His payoff from not
continuing, however, decreases exactly by S, namely, from L to L − S. Continuation may now
be profitable for the owner in marginally profitable states where it was previously unprofitable.
Accordingly, introducing severance pay may lower the owner’s privately optimal cutoff θP .20
The next question is whether the owner should set S so high to push θP all the way down to
θFB, thus eliminating any inefficiency? The answer is no. At the first-best cutoff θP = θFB, the
efficiency loss due to a marginal increase in θP generated by a small decrease in S is zero. The
benefit (i.e., the cost saving) of a decrease in S is of first-order magnitude, however. Formally,
the owner’s objective function if S > 0 isZ θ
θP
E[x− w(x) | θ]f(θ)dθ + (L− S)F (θP ).
20While this monotonic relation between S and θP holds if w(x) is an option (plus possibly a base wage), it
does not necessarily hold for arbitrary (i.e., suboptimal) compensation schemes.
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Inserting the (binding) efficiency-wage constraint (7), this transforms toZ θ
θP
[E[x | θ]− J − L] f(θ)dθ + L− S −∆. (8)
By inspection, reducing S affects the owner’s expected payoff both directly (positive effect) as
well as indirectly via θP (negative effect). The total derivative of (8) with respect to S is
−∂θP
∂S
[E[x | θP ]− J − L]− 1.
At the first-best cutoff θFB, it holds that E[x | θFB] = J + L. Hence, if θP = θFB the total
derivative is −1, implying that a small reduction in S is strictly profitable.
To summarize, while introducing severance pay may mitigate the inefficiency, eliminating it
altogether is too costly. In fact, it is not clear whether including severance pay is optimal at
all, i.e., whether it is optimal to set S > 0. The answer depends on the underlying probability
distributions F (θ) and Gθ(x).What is clear, however, is that our previously studied inefficiency
remains, implying that Proposition 1 continues to hold.
Proposition 2. Proposition 1 continues to hold if severance pay is possible.
Proof. See Appendix.
5.3 The Efficiency-Wage Constraint
We now derive the efficiency-wage constraint (2) from first principles. For the sake of brevity,
we only present the analysis for our basic model. The analysis with severance pay is, subject to
minor modifications, similar.21
As we have noted in the main text, optimality prescribes to compensate the employee only
if he performed the task. This immediately gives the employee’s out-of-equilibrium payoff: If
the employee does not perform the required task, he will optimally quit at t = 0.5 rather than
stay in the firm. Hence, the employee’s payoff if he does not perform the task is simply his
21Precisely, if the employee receives severance pay both if the owner exits and if the employee voluntarily quits,
we obtain the efficiency-wage constraint (7) from Section 5.2. By contrast, if the employee receives severance pay
only if the owner exits (but not if the employee quits), we obtain our previous constraint (2).
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unemployment benefit J.22 By contrast, his expected payoff if he performs the task isZ θ
θP
E[w(x) | θ]f(θ)dθ + F (θP )J −∆,
which implies he will perform the task if and only ifZ θ
θP
E[w(x) | θ]f(θ)dθ + F (θP )J −∆ ≥ J,
which represents the employee’s incentive-compatibility constraint. Rearranging yields the
efficiency-wage constraint (2) in the main text.
5.4 Renegotiation
The inefficiency that the owner exits in marginally profitable states θ ∈ (θFB, θP ] potentially
provides scope for mutually beneficial renegotiations: To make continuation more attractive
for the owner, the employee might be willing to take a paycut to secure at least some of his
rents. (Recall that the employee’s expected compensation under continuation strictly exceeds his
unemployment benefit.) As the state of nature is private information, however, such potentially
beneficial renegotiations will fail.
We consider the following model of renegotiation. After the state of nature has materialized
but before the owner makes his decision, either the owner or the employee can offer a new
compensation scheme w(x).23 If the owner makes the offer, the employee must agree. If the
employee rejects the offer, the original compensation scheme remains in effect Conversely, if the
employee makes the offer, the owner must agree. As the following proposition shows, irrespective
of who makes the offer, the unique optimal compensation scheme derived in Proposition 1 will
not be renegotiated in equilibrium.
Proposition 3. The unique optimal compensation scheme in Proposition 1 is renegotiation-
proof. That is, regardless of whether the owner or the employee can make new offers, this
22This clarifies an earlier statement that we are free to specify the possible consequences for the firm if the
employee does not perform his task. As the employee then optimally quits at t = 0.5, what happens to the firm
at t = 1 is irrelevant for his (out-of-equilibrium) payoff.
23There is no point in renegotiating before the state of nature has materialized. By contrast, we may allow
for renegotiations to take place after the owner has made his decision provided this decision is reversible. (The
decision has no signalling value in this case.) If the exit decision is irreversible, it is too late for renegotiations.
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compensation scheme will not be renegotiated with positive probability in any (perfect Bayesian)
equilibrium of the renegotiation game.
Proof. See Appendix.
Let us provide the intuition for the case where S = 0; the case where S ≥ 0 is analyzed in the
Appendix. Suppose the owner proposes (or accepts) to replace the optimal compensation scheme
w(x) with some other compensation scheme ew(x). As the owner knows the true state of nature,
it must hold that E[x− ew(x) | θ] ≥ E[x− w(x) | θ], or equivalently, E[w(x) | θ] ≤ E[ ew(x) | θ].
Accordingly, in states of nature θ ≥ θp(w) in which the owner would have continued anyway,
replacing w(x) with ew(x) merely shifts rents from the employee to the owner, thus making the
employee worse off. This implies that, for renegotiations to be mutually beneficial, it must hold
that (i) the new compensation scheme ew(x) induces continuation in strictly more states of nature
than the original (i.e., optimal) compensation scheme, i.e., θp( ew) < θp(w), and (ii) the employee
must attach a reasonably high probability that the current state of nature lies between θp( ew)
and θp(w).
Unfortunately, there is no easy way for the owner to credibly signal that the current state is
θ ∈ [θp( ew), θp(w)), or for the employee to screen the owner’s “type” θ. The reason is that, if the
owner prefers the new compensation scheme ew(x) to the original, optimal compensation scheme
w(x) in state θ, he will also prefer ew(x) to w(x) in all higher states eθ > θ.24 Intuitively, the
optimal compensation scheme shifts as much as possible of the employee’s compensation into
high cash-flow states, which implies that any other compensation scheme ew(x) 6= w(x) would
make the owner better off. Consequently, the employee will continue to hold his prior beliefs
f(θ), implying that he will prefer w(x) over ew(x) if and only ifZ θ
θP ( ew)E[ ew(x) | θ]f(θ)dθ + F (θP )J ≥
Z θ
θP
E[w(x) | θ]f(θ)dθ + F (θP )J,
24This is because the optimal compensation scheme w(x) is an option (plus a base equal to J). Any other
compensation scheme ew(x) satisfying Assumption 2 and ew(x) ≥ J must either (i) leave the owner strictly less
for all x or (ii) satisfy ew(x) ≥ w(x) for all x ≤ ex and ew(x) ≤ w(x) for all x > ex for some interior ex ∈ X, with
strict inequality on a set of positive measure. In case (i) the owner never prefers ew to w. In case (ii), the asserted
statement follows directly from Assumption 1.
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or Z θ
θP ( ew)[E[ ew(x) | θ]− J ]f(θ)dθ ≥
Z θ
θP
[E[w(x) | θ]− J ]f(θ)dθ. (9)
By Lemma 2, the right-hand side in (9) is equal to ∆, which implies the optimal compensation
scheme w(x) satisfies the employee’s efficiency-wage constraint (2) with equality. By (9), this in
turn implies that the new compensation scheme ew(x) must also satisfy (2). This cannot be true,
however: If there exists a compensation scheme ew(x) 6= w(x) satisfying (2) (as well as w(x) ≥ J)
and implementing a lower cutoff θp( ew) < θp(w), the compensation scheme w(x) cannot not be
optimal. Hence, we have a contradiction, implying that the employee will neither propose nor
accept to replace w(x) with ew(x).
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper argues that broad-based option pay maximizes the efficiency of strategic decisions by
firm owners, such as, e.g., whether to continue the firm, shut it down, or sell it. In our model,
future expected wage payments inefficiently bias the owner of a firm towards exiting. Broad-
based option pay shifts most of these future wage payments into states of nature where expected
firm profits are high, thereby leaving the owner as much as possible in states where expected firm
profits are low. This minimizes the wedge between the first-best continuation decision and the
owner’s privately optimal decision, thereby maximizing efficiency. While introducing severance
pay may (but need not) improve the owner’s continuation decision, some inefficiency always
remains, implying that broad-based option pay remains uniquely optimal even if severance pay
is possible.
While our model has a single, representative employee, it does not insinuate that the employee
has any significant impact on firm output. Nor is there any interaction or free-riding among
employees. Hence, our argument extends to the firm’s employees as a whole, making it indeed
a theory of broad option pay. Our model does, however, assume that the objective function is
to maximize firm value. This suggests that it may be particularly relevant for small, owner-
controlled firms (e.g., new economy firms). Empirically, it appears that broad option pay is
indeed more pervasive in these kinds of firms (see Introduction). Moreover, our argument
requires that there is considerable uncertainty–coupled with asymmetric information–about
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future firm profits. This may help understand a finding in the empirical literature that broad-
based option pay–and high-powered compensation more generally–is more pervasive in volatile
industries (Prendergast (2002), Oyer and Schaefer (2003)). Again, new economy firms appear
to fit this picture.
An interesting question that we have not explored here is what happens if the continuation
decision is made by a manager whose interests diverge from the interests of the firm’s owner.
Given the owner’s bias, it may be optimal to employ such a manager to make more efficient de-
cisions, which would in turn require a hands-off policy by the firm’s owner (see Burkart, Gromb,
and Panunzi (1997)). On the other hand, delegating decision-making power to a manager with
diverging interests may introduce new inefficiencies, such as empire building and entrenchment.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. If (2) did not bind, once could adjust w(x) slightly so that (2) still holds
while the owner is strictly better off. To prove this, we must first define a feasible adjustment
to w(x) such that the employee’s payoff does not fall below J for all x ∈ X and Assumption
2 remains satisfied. By Assumption 2 w(x) is continuous and almost everywhere differentiable,
and it satisfies w0(x) ≥ 0 at points of differentiability. We can distinguish between the following
two cases.
In the first case, w0(x) > 0 holds strictly for a set of positive measure. In this case, we
define a new compensation scheme ew(x) by the requirements that ew(0) = w(0) and that at
points of differentiability ew0(x) = w0(x)(1− ε), where 0 ≤ ε < 1. By construction, ew(x) satisfies
Assumption 2, while ew(x) ≥ K holds for all x ∈ X. Note also that E[ ew(x) | θ] is continuous
and strictly increasing in ε for all θ. By the latter implication, the owner would be strictly
better off by offering ew(x) with ε > 0 if (2) was still satisfied. As (2) was originally slack by
assumption, it is still satisfied for all sufficiently small values ε in case the employee’s payoff is
also continuous in ε. By continuity of E[ ew | θ] and as F (θ) has no atoms, this holds surely if
the cutoff θP ( ew) is continuous in ε, which follows immediately from the definition of θP and
continuity of E[ ew(x) | θ] in ε.
In the second case, w(x) is a fixed wage. As w(x) must satisfy (2), this implies w(0) > J . We
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can now simply construct an alternative feasible compensation scheme where ew(x) = w(x)− ε.
Again, for sufficiently small ε > 0 (2) is still satisfied while the owner is made strictly better off.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. Proposition 1 claims that the optimal compensation scheme satisfies
w(x) = J +max{x− s, 0} for some s ∈ (x, x). We argue to a contradiction. Suppose that some
other compensation scheme w(x) that does not satisfy w(x) = J + max{0, x − s} is optimal.
Recall now that the constraint (2) binds by Lemma 2, while by the arguments in the main text
it follows that θP (w) > θFB. Moreover, it must hold that w(x) ≥ J . We now construct a new
compensation scheme ew(x) = J +max{0, x − es} as follows. We keep the original cutoff θP (w)
fixed and choose es such that the constraint (2) is still satisfied with equality, requiringZ θ
θP (w)
µZ x
es (x− es)gθ(x)dx
¶
f(θ)dθ = ∆. (10)
Existence of a unique value 0 < es < x solving (10) is immediate.25 We show now that the
true cutoff under the new compensation scheme, θP ( ew), is strictly lower than the original cutoff
θP (w).
Claim 1. It holds that θP ( ew) < θP (w).
Proof. It is convenient to use the following transformation. Take any function a(x) that is
continuous and differentiable almost everywhere on x ∈ X. Partial integration yieldsZ
X
a(x)gθ(x)dx = a(0) +
Z
X
a0(x)[1−Gθ(x)]dx. (11)
Note next that the derivative of ew(x) satisfies ew0(x) = 0 for x < es and ew0(x) = 1 for
x > es. Also, by Assumption 2 the original compensation scheme w(x) is continuous and almost
everywhere differentiable. Using the transformation (11), we then obtain for all θ
E[ ew(x)− w(x) | θ] = Z xes [1− w0(x)] [1−Gθ(x)] dx−
Z es
0
w0(x) [1−Gθ(x)] dx (12)
+J − w(0),
25As (2) holds at the original compensation scheme, the left-hand side of (10) surely exceeds ∆ at es = 0. Ates = x the left-hand side of (10) is lower than ∆. Moreover, by Assumptions 1 and 2–together with continuity of
gθ(x)–the left-hand side of (10) is also continuous and strictly decreasing in es.
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where we used that ew(0) = J . As both w(x) and ew(x) satisfy (2), holding θP (w) fixed, there
must exist at least one state θP (w) < eθ < θ such that
E[ ew(x)− w(x) | eθ] = 0. (13)
We next transform (12) into
E[ ew(x)−w(x) | θ] = Z xes [1− w0(x)]
h
1−Geθ(x)
i "1−Gθ(x)
1−Geθ(x)
#
dx (14)
−
Z es
0
w0(x)
h
1−Geθ(x)
i "1−Gθ(x)
1−Geθ(x)
#
dx+ J − w(0).
By Assumption 2 we have 0 ≤ w0(x) ≤ 1. Moreover, as ew(x) satisfies (10) and as (2) is
binding under w(x), w0(x) < 1 holds strictly over a positive measure of values x > es. Likewise,
we must either have w(0) > J or w0(x) > 0 must hold strictly over a positive measure of values
x < es. Note next that Assumption 1 implies for all θ < θ < eθ that 1−Gθ(x)1−Geθ (x) is strictly decreasing
in x.26 Note also that this implies from 0 < es < x that 1−Gθ(es)1−Geθ (es) < 1. We thus obtain from (14)
E[ ew(x)− w(x) | θ]
<
1−Gθ(es)
1−Geθ(es)
"Z x
es [1− w0(x)]
h
1−Geθ(x)
i
dx−
Z es
0
w0(x)
h
1−Geθ(x)
i
dx+ J − w(0)
#
,
which after substitution of (13) transforms into
E[ ew(x)− w(x) | θ] < 1−Gθ(es)
1−Geθ(es)E[ ew(x)− w(x) | eθ] = 0. (15)
This implies for all θ < eθ that the owner’s payoff from continuation is strictly higher under
the new compensation scheme, i.e., that E[x − ew | θ] strictly exceeds E[x − w(x) | θ]. Recall
now that the original cutoff satisfies θP (w) > θFB and that, by Lemma 1, it is determined by
the indifference condition E[x−w(x) | θP (w)] = L. This together with the fact that E[ ew(x) | θ]
is strictly increasing in θ then implies θP ( ew) < θP (w). Q.E.D.
Recall now from (10) that ew(x) satisfies (2) with equality if we apply the cutoff from the
original compensation scheme, θP (w). Using θP ( ew) < θP (w) from Claim 1, inspection of (2)
26 In fact, Assumption 1 is stronger as it also requires that the distribution function is everywhere absolutely
continuous.
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reveals that the constraint still holds under the new compensation scheme if we apply the true
threshold, θP ( ew). Hence, to prove that the original compensation scheme was not optimal it
only remains to show that the owner is strictly better off under ew(x). This follows immediately
from the observation that he would–by construction of ew(x)–realize the same expected payoff
if he still applied the old cutoff θP (w), while by Claim 1 he strictly prefers a different cutoff
under the new compensation scheme.
We have thus shown that an optimal compensation scheme must satisfy w(x) = J+max{0, s−
x}. Establishing that there is a unique optimal choice of s is straightforward. As the employee’s
payoff is continuous in s, which follows as θP changes continuously in s, there exists a compact
set of s−values for which (2) binds. As the owner’s expected payoff is strictly increasing in s,
the largest value in this set uniquely defines the unique optimal compensation scheme. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We now extend the argument of Proposition 1 to the case where
S > 0. As the cutoff now depends on both w(x) and S we denote it by θP (S,w). (Where this
is without ambiguity, we will, however, again abbreviate the cutoff by writing θP .) We argue
now to a contradiction and assume optimality of a compensation scheme (S,w(x)) where w(x)
is not given by w(x) = J +min{0, x− s}. Note first that the proof of Lemma 2 did not rely on
the choice S = 0, implying that the constraint (2) must bind irrespective of the choice of S. We
now construct a new compensation scheme (S, ew(x)) where ew(x) = J +min{0, x−es} and where
Z θ
θP (S,w)
∙µZ x
es (x− es)gθ(x)dx
¶
− S
¸
f(θ)dθ = ∆. (16)
Again, existence of a unique such value es is immediate. Next, the arguments of Claim 1 in
Proposition 1 do not depend on the choice S = 0 and, therefore, extend immediately to S > 0.
We thus have that θP (S, ew) < θP (S,w).
As in the proof of Proposition 1, we are done if ew(x) satisfies (2), once we apply the true
cutoff θP ( ew). We distinguish now between two cases. Assume first that θP (S, ew) ≥ θFB. Note
next that, by definition of the optimal cutoff, we have E[x− ew(x) | θP (S, ew)] = L− S, while by
θP (S, ew) ≥ θFB we have E[x | θP (S, ew)] ≥ L + J , which together imply E[ ew(x) | θP (S, ew)] ≥
S + J . By Assumption 1 we then have for all θP (S, ew) ≤ θ ≤ θP (S,w), i.e., over the whole new
set of states for which the owner changes his decision, that E[ ew(x) | θ] ≥ S+J , which completes
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the proof.
Take now the other case where θP (S, ew) < θFB. In this case we have to add an intermediate
step. We construct another compensation scheme (bS, bw(x)) where bS < S and where bw(x) =
J+min{0, x−bs} with bs > es. Hence, under the new compensation scheme the employee gets less
both when the firm is continued and when the owner decides to exit. We also choose (bS, bw(x))
such that (i) the true cutoff satisfies θP (bS, bw) = θFB and that (ii) under the original threshold,
θP (S,w), the constraint (2) still holds with equality, i.e.,Z θ
θP (S,w)
∙µZ x
bs (x− bs)gθ(x)dx
¶
− bS¸ f(θ)dθ = ∆. (17)
We establish first existence of a compensation scheme (bS, bw(x)) with these characteristics.
Claim 1. In case θP (S, ew) < θFB, we can find a compensation scheme satisfying (bS, bw(x)),
where bS < S, bw(x) = J +min{0, x− bs} with bs > es, θP (bS, bw) = θFB, and the requirement (17).
Proof. We first argue that a compensation scheme with these characteristics would satisfy
θP (bS, bw) > θP (S, ew). To see this, note that by (16) and (17) there exists at least one state
θP (S,w) < eθ < θ such that
E[ ew(x)− S | eθ] = E[ bw(x)− bS | eθ]. (18)
Using again the transformation (11), we have next that
E[( ew(x)− S)− ( bw(x)− bS) | θ] = Z bses [1−Gθ(x)] dx− (bS − S),
which by Assumption 1 is strictly increasing in θ. (Precisely, this follows from strict First-Order
Stochastic Dominance, which is implied by Assumption 1.) Together with (18) this implies
E[ ew(x) − S | θ] < E[ bw(x) − bS | θ] for all θ < eθ. Using θP (S,w) < eθ and θP (S, ew) < θP (S,w),
this holds also at θ = θP (S, ew). The assertion that θP (bS, bw) > θP (S, ew) follows then immediately
from the definition of the cutoff θP .
We can now proceed by reducing bS and increasing bs until θP (bS, bw) becomes indeed equal to
θFB. This is feasible as we already know that θP is continuous in both bS and bs, while at bS = 0
it must hold that θP (bS, bw) > θFB. (Note that bs < x is needed to satisfy (17).) Q.E.D.
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As θP (bS, bw) = θFB, we already know from the argument for the case with θP (S, ew) ≤ θFB
that (bS, bw(x)) satisfies (2) also if we apply the true threshold θP (bS, bw). That the owner is
strictly better off follows finally again from (17) and as the owner’s new optimal cutoff is strictly
different from θP (S,w). Q.E.D.
We have thus established that any optimal compensation scheme w(x) must satisfy w(x) =
J +min{0, x− s}. The fact that θP > θFB follows from the argument in the main text. Finally,
for a given choice of S we have again a unique corresponding choice of s. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall first from Propositions 1-2 that w(x) = J + min{0, x − s}.
Moreover, for a given choice of S ≥ 0 the value of s is also uniquely pinned down. It is now
convenient to assume that there is also a uniquely optimal level of S ≥ 0, though the proof can
be extended at the cost of adding additional notation. For brevity we refer to the unique optimal
(commitment) compensation scheme just as (S,w(x)). The following result is now intuitive from
the insights of Proposition 1.
Claim 1. Given some other compensation scheme ew(x) satisfying E[ ew(x) | bθ] ≤ E[w(x) | bθ]
for some bθ < θ, it holds that E[ ew(x) | θ] < E[w(x) | θ] for all θ > bθ.
Proof. We argue to a contradiction and assume that E[ ew(x) | bθ] ≤ E[w(x) | bθ] and that
E[ ew(x) | θ] ≥ E[w(x) | θ] for some θ > bθ. Using continuity of E[ ew(x) | θ] and E[w(x) | θ]
this implies existence of some bθ ≤ eθ < bθ such that E[ ew(x) | eθ] = E[w(x) | eθ]. We can now
fully apply the argument in Claim 1 of Proposition 1 to show that, by construction of w(x)
and Assumptions 1-2, this must imply E[ ew(x) | θ] < E[w(x) | θ], which yields a contradiction.
Precisely, we obtain
E[w(x)− ew(x) | θ] > 1−Gθ(s)
1−Geθ(s)E[w(x)− ew(x) | eθ] = 0.
Q.E.D.
Consider now first the game where the employee makes some offer (eS, ew(x)). By optimality,
the owner will then only have to pay min{S, eS} if he decides to exit, while for a given θ he
will only have to pay the expected compensation min{E[w(x) | θ], E[ ew(x) | θ]} if he decides to
continue. It is thus immediate that offering eS < S is not optimal for the employee. Moreover,
in case eS ≥ S the new severance pay offer is clearly irrelevant as the owner will reject it if
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he prefers to exit. The new offer is also only profitable for the employee if it increases the
set of states for which the firm is continued, i.e., if θP (eS, ew) < θP (S,w). As this implies at
θP (eS, ew) that E[ ew(x) | θP (eS, ew)] > E[w(x) | θP (eS, ew)], we have by Claim 1 that E[ ew(x) | θ] >
E[w(x) | θ] holds for all θ where the owner chooses continuation. As a consequence, offering
a new compensation scheme ew(x) that reduces the cutoff is only beneficial for the employee if
condition (9) from the main text holds. As we argued in the main text, this is not possible.
Suppose next the owner offers a new compensation scheme. As he knows the true state
θ, we have a game of signaling. By specifying optimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs that put a
lot of probability mass on high states θ, it is straightforward to support an equilibrium where
no acceptable new offer is made. We show next that there are no successful renegotiations in
any (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium. Though the argument holds generally, for brevity’s sake we
restrict attention to equilibria where the employee accepts a new offer in case he is indifferent,
given his beliefs about the proposing types. (Note that if the employee rejects the new offer, the
old compensation scheme remains in place.)
We argue again to a contradiction and suppose that, in a given equilibrium, there is a
non-empty set of accepted new compensation schemes, which we denote by Ω. By previous
arguments it is straightforward that we can restrict consideration to changes in the wage paid
in case of continuation: Ω = {wi(x)}i∈I , where I is some index set. Denote eΩ = Ω ∪ {w(x)}
and denote the new cutoff, given the compensation schemes in eΩ, by θP (eΩ).27 We denote
one of the compensation schemes that the owner prefers at θ = θP (eΩ) by ew(x). From our
previous arguments we know that we can restrict consideration to the case where θP (eΩ) < θP (w).
Moreover, by Claim 1 we know that for all states θ > θP (eΩ) the owner strictly prefers to offer
a new compensation scheme from Ω. In all states θ > θP (eΩ) the owner will also offer the
most preferred compensation scheme in Ω, which is the least preferred choice for the employee.
Consequently, an upper boundary for the employee’s payoff in the renegotiation game is given
by the case where only the compensation scheme ew(x) is offered. But we already know for this
case that the employee would be strictly worse off when accepting the offer–a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
27Formally, the existence of such a cutoff follows as maxi∈I0 E[wi(x) | θ], where we write eΩ = {wi(x)}i∈I0 , is by
Assumption 2 nondecreasing and continuous in θ.
27
8 References
Bergman, Nittai, and Dirk Jenter, 2003, Employee sentiment and stock option compensation,
mimeo, MIT.
Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb, and Fausto Panunzi, 1997, Large shareholders, monitoring, and
the value of the firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 693-728.
Core, John E., and Wayne Guay, 2001, Stock option plans for non-executive employees, Journal
of Financial Economics 8, 3-29.
Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart, 1983, Implicit contracts under asymmetric infor-
mation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, Supplement Issue, 123-156.
Hall, Brian J., and Kevin J. Murphy, 2003, The trouble with stock options, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 17, 49-70.
Innes, Robert, 1990, Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices,
Journal of Economic Theory 52, 45-67.
Ittner, Christoper D., Richard A. Lambert, and David F. Larcker, 2003, The structure and
performance consequences of equity grants to employees of new economy firms, Journal of
Accounting and Economics 34, 89-127.
Kedia, Simi, and Abon Mozumdar, 2002, Performance impact of employee stock options,
mimeo, Harvard University.
Laffont, Jean-Jaques, and Jean Tirole, 1993, A theory of incentives in procurement and regu-
lation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Lazear, Edward P., 1999, Output-based pay: Incentives or sorting? NBER Working Paper
7419.
Mehran, Hamid, and Joseph Tracy, 2001, The impact of employee stock options on the evolution
of compensation in the 1990s, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review
7, 17-34.
28
Milgrom, Paul R., 1981, Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications,
Bell Journal of Economics 12, 380-391.
Oyer, Paul, 2004, Why do firms use incentives that have no incentive effects? Journal of
Finance, 59, 1619-1650.
Oyer, Paul, and Scott Schaefer, 2003, Why do some firms give stock options to all employ-
ees? An empirical examination of alternative theories, Journal of Financial Economics,
forthcoming.
Oyer, Paul, and Scott Schaefer, 2004, Accounting, governance, and broad-based stock option
grants, mimeo, Stanford University.
Prendergast, Canice, 2002, The tenuous trade-off between risk and incentives, Journal of Po-
litical Economy 110, 1071-1102.
Weitzman, Martin L., 1985, The simple macroeconomics of profit sharing, American Economic
Review 75, 937-953.
Weitzman, Martin L., and Douglas Kruse, 1990, Profit sharing and productivity, in: Paying
for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence, Alan S. Blinder (ed.), Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution.
Yellen, Janet L., 1994, Efficiency wage models of unemployment, American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings 74, 200-205.
29
